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Abstract: Episodes of market crashes have fascinated economists for centuries. 
Although many academics, practitioners and policy makers have studied questions 
related to collapsing asset price bubbles, there is little consensus yet about their 
causes and effects. This review and essay evaluates some of the hypotheses offered to 
explain the market crashes that often follow asset price bubbles. Starting from 
historical accounts and syntheses of past bubbles and crashes, we put the problem in 
perspective with respect to the development of the efficient market hypothesis. We 
then present the models based on heterogeneous agents and the limits to arbitrage that 
prevent rational agents from bursting bubbles before they inflate. Then, we explore 
another set of explanations of why rational traders would be led to actually profit 
from and surf on bubbles, by anticipating the behavior of noise traders or by realizing 
the difficulties in synchronizing their actions. We then end by discussing a complex 
system approach of social imitation leading to collective market regimes like herding 
and the phenomenon of bifurcation (or phase transition) that rationalize what crash 
can occur in unstable market regimes. The key insight is that diagnosing bubbles may 
be feasible when taking into account the positive feedback mechanisms that give rise 
to transient “super-exponential” price growth, the bubbles. 
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I. Irrational Euphoria 
 
The two acclaimed classic books, Galbraith's “The Great Crash 1929 (Galbraith, 
1954) and Kindleberger’s “Manias, Panics and Crash” (Kindleberger, 1978) provide 
the most commonly accepted explanation of the 1929 boom and crash. Galbraith 
argues that a bubble in the stock market was formed during the rapid economic 
growth of the 1920s. Both him and Kindleberger in his extensive historical 
compendium of financial excesses emphasize the irrational element -the mania- that 
induced the public to invest in the bull “over-heating” market. The rise in the stock 
market, according to Galbraith's account (1954 and 1988, pp. xii-xiii), depended on 
“the vested interest in euphoria [that] leads men and women, individuals and 
institutions to believe that all will be better, that they are meant to be richer and to 
dismiss as intellectually deficient what is in conflict with that conviction.” This 
eagerness to buy stocks was then fueled by an expansion of credit in the form of 
brokers' loans that encouraged investors to become dangerously leveraged. In this 
respect, Shiller (2000) argues that the stock price increase was driven by irrational 
euphoria among individual investors, fed by an emphatic media, which maximized 
TV ratings and catered to investor demand for pseudo-news. 
 
Kindleberger (1978) summarizes his compilation of many historical bubbles as 
follows.  
· The upswing usually starts with an opportunity - new markets, new technologies or 
some dramatic political change - and investors looking for good returns. 
· It proceeds through the euphoria of rising prices, particularly of assets, while an 
expansion of credit inflates the bubble. 
· In the manic phase, investors scramble to get out of money and into illiquid things 
such as stocks, commodities, real estate or tulip bulbs: 'a larger and larger group of 
people seeks to become rich without a real understanding of the processes involved'. 
· Ultimately, the markets stop rising and people who have borrowed heavily find 
themselves overstretched. This is 'distress', which generates unexpected failures, 
followed by 'revulsion' or 'discredit'. 
· The final phase is a self-feeding panic, where the bubble bursts. People of wealth 
and credit scramble to unload whatever they have bought at greater and greater losses, 
and cash becomes king. 
 
While this makes for compelling reading, many questions remain unanswered. There 
is little consideration about how much fundamentals contributed to the bull market 
and what might have triggered the speculative mania. Galbraith (1954) cited margin 
buying, the formation of closed-end investment trusts, the transformation of financiers 
into celebrities, and other qualitative signs of euphoria to support his view. Recent 
evidence supports the concept of the growth of a social procyclical mood that 
promotes the attraction for investing in the stock markets by a larger and larger 
fraction of the population as the bubble grows (Roehner and Sornette, 2000). 
 
Furthermore, Galbraith's and Kindleberger’s accounts are vague about the causes of 
the market crash, believing that almost any event could have triggered irrational 
investors to sell towards the end of bubble, not really explaining the reason for the 
crash. Instead, they side-step the thorny question of the occurrence and timing of the 
crash by focusing on the inevitability of the bubble's collapse and suggest several 
factors that could have exploded public confidence and caused prices to plummet. 
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Furthermore, little has been done to identify the precise role of external events in 
provoking the collapse. 
 
In the words of Shiller (1989), a crash is a time when “the investing public en masse 
capriciously changes its mind.” But, as with the more rational theories, this 
explanation again leaves unanswered the question why such tremendous capricious 
changes in sentiment occur. Other studies have argued that even though fundamentals 
appeared high in 1929, Irving Fisher (1930), for example, argued throughout 1929 
and 1930 that the high level of prices in 1929 reflected an expectation that future 
corporate cash flows would be very high. Fisher believed this expectation to be 
warranted after a decade of steadily increasing earnings and dividends, rapidly 
improving technologies, and monetary stability. In hindsight, it has become clear that 
even though fundamentals appeared high in 1929, the stock market rise was clearly 
excessive. A recent empirical study (De Long and Shleifer, 1991)) concludes that the 
stocks making up the S&P500 composite were priced at least 30 percent above 
fundamentals in late summer, 1929. Eugene N. White (2006) suggests that the 1929 
boom can not be readily explained by fundamentals, represented by expected 
dividend growth or changes in the equity premium. 
 
While Galbraith's and Kindleberger’s classical views have been most often cited by 
the mass media, they had received little scholarly attention. Since the 1960s, in 
parallel with the emergence of the efficient-market hypothesis, their position has lost 
ground among economists and especially financial economists. 
 
 
II. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis that actual prices reflect fundamental values is the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH). Market efficiency is of paramount importance to financial 
economists because it lays the foundations of economics and finance. And, therefore, 
it is no surprise that over the last several years, a large volume of empirical work has 
attempted to justify a variety of ways in which markets are efficient. Market 
efficiency assumes two things: no limited arbitrage as described above and agents’ 
rationality. The agents’ rationality means that agents update their beliefs correctly 
when they receive new information, and the subjective distribution they use to 
forecast future realizations of asset prices and returns is indeed the distribution from 
which those realizations are drawn. 
 
In an efficient market, an asset price equals its “fundamental value”. This is defined 
as the discounted sum of expected future cash flows where, in forming expectations, 
investors correctly process all available information. Therefore, in an efficient market, 
there is “no free lunch”: no investment strategy can earn excess risk-adjusted average 
returns, or average returns greater than are warranted for its risk. Proponents of the 
efficient markets hypothesis (Friedman, 1953; Fama, 1965) argue that rational 
speculative activity would not only eliminate riskless arbitrage opportunities. Fama 
(1965, p.38) states that, if there are many sophisticated traders in the market, they 
may cause these bubbles to burst before they have a chance to really get under way. 
 
To illustrate this argument, suppose that the fundamental value of a share of Yahoo! is 
$30. Imagine that a group of irrational traders becomes excessively pessimistic about 
 4 
Yahoo!’s future prospects and through its selling, pushes the price to $20. Defenders 
of the EMH argue that rational traders, sensing an attractive opportunity, will buy the 
security at its bargain price and at the same time, hedge their bet by shorting a 
“substitute” security, such as Google, that has similar cash flows to Yahoo! in future 
states of the world. The buying pressure on Yahoo! Shares will then bring their price 
back to fundamental value of $30. Therefore, in an efficient market, bubbles do not 
exist. 
 
However, after years of effort, it has become clear that some basic empirical facts 
about the stock markets cannot be understood in this framework (West, 1988). The 
efficient markets hypothesis lost ground entirely after the burst of the internet bubble 
in 2000, providing one of the recent most striking episodes of anomalous price 
behavior and volatility in the most well developed capital markets of the world. The 
movement of Internet stock prices during the late 1990s was extraordinary in many 
respects. The Internet sector earned over 1000 percent returns on its public equity in 
the two year period from early 1998 through February 2000. The valuations of these 
stocks began to collapse shortly thereafter and by the end of the same year, they had 
returned to pre-1998 levels, losing nearly 70% from the peak. The extraordinary 
returns of 1998 to Feb. 2000 had largely disappeared by the end of 2000. Although on 
February of 2000, the vast majority of internet-related companies had negative 
earnings, the Internet sector in U.S. was equal to 6% of the market capitalization of all 
U.S. public companies, and 20% of the publicly traded volume of the U.S. stock 
market (see, e.g., Ofek and Richardson, 2002; 2003)). 
 
Ofek and Richardson (2003) used the financial data from 400 companies in the 
Internet-related sectors and analyzed how large their stock prices differed from their 
fundamental values estimated by using Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) model for 
stock valuation (see French and Poterba, 1991)). Since almost all companies in the 
Internet sector had negative earnings, they estimated the (implied) price-to-earnings 
ratio (P/E) ratios which are derived from the revenue streams of these firms rather 
than their earnings that would be read from the 1999 financial data. Their results are 
striking. Almost 20% of the internet-related firms have P/E ratios in excess of 1500, 
while over 50% exceed 500, and the aggregate P/E ratio of the entire Internet sector is 
605. Under the assumptions that the aggregate long-run P/E ratio is 20 on average 
(which is already on the large end member from an historical point of view), the 
Internet sector would have needed to generate 40.6% excess returns over a 10-year 
period to justify the P/E ratio of 605 implied in 2000. The vast majority of the implied 
P/Es are much too high relative to the P/Es usually obtained by firms. By almost any 
standard, this clearly represented “irrational” valuation levels. These and similar 
figures led many to believe that this set of stocks was in the midst of an asset price 
bubble. 
 
 
III. Heterogeneous Beliefs and Limit to Arbitrage 
 
The collapsing Internet bubble have thrown new light on the old subject and raised 
the acute question of why have not rational investors moved into the market and 
driven the Internet stock prices back to their fundamental valuations? 
 
Two conditions are in general invoked as being necessary for prices to deviate from 
 5 
fundamental value. First, there must be some degree of irrationality in the market. 
That is, investors’ demand for stocks must be driven by something other than 
fundamentals, like overconfidence in the future. Second, even if a market has such 
investors, the general argument is that rational investors will drive prices back to 
fundamental value. For this not to happen, there needs to be some limits on arbitrage. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a description for various limits of arbitrage. With 
respect to the equity market, clearly the most important impediment to arbitrage are 
short sales restrictions. Roughly 70% of mutual funds explicitly state (in SEC Form 
N-SAR) that they are not permitted to sell short (Almazan et al., 2004). Seventy-nine 
percent of equity mutual funds make no use of derivatives whatsoever (either futures 
or options), suggesting further that funds do not take synthetically short positions 
(Koski and Pontiff, 1999)). These figures indicate that the vast majority of funds 
never take short positions. 
 
Recognizing that the world has limited arbitrage and a significant numbers of 
irrational investors, the finance literature has evolved to increasingly recognize the 
evidence of deviations from fundamental value. One important class of theories 
shows that there can be large movements in asset prices due to the combined effects 
of heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales constraints. The basic idea finds its root back 
to the original CAPM theories, in particular, Lintner (1969)’s model of asset prices 
with investors having heterogeneous beliefs. In his model, asset prices are a weighted 
average of beliefs about asset payoffs with the weights being determined by the 
investor’s risk aversion and beliefs about asset price covariances. Lintner (1969), and 
many others after him, show that widely inflated prices can occur. 
 
Many other asset pricing models in the spirit of Lintner (1969) have been proposed 
(See, for example, Miller (1977), Jarrow (1980), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Chen, 
Hong and Stein (2000, 2002), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Duffie, Garleanu 
and Pedersen (2002)). In these models which assume heterogeneous beliefs and short 
sales restrictions, the asset prices are determined at equilibrium to the extent that they 
reflect the heterogeneous beliefs about payoffs, but short sales restrictions force the 
pessimistic investors out of the market, leaving only optimistic investors and thus 
inflated asset price levels. However, when short sales restrictions no longer bind 
investors, then prices fall back down. This provides a possible account of the bursting 
of the Internet bubble that developed in 1998-2000. As documented by Ofek and 
Richardson (2003) and Cochrane (2003), typically as much as 80% of Internet-related 
shares were locked up. This is due to the fact that many Internet companies had gone 
through recent initial public offerings (IPOs) and regulations impose that shares held 
by insiders and other pre-IPO equity holders cannot be traded for at least 6 months 
after the IPO date. The float of the Internet sector dramatically increased as the 
lockups of many of these stocks expired. The unlocking of literally hundreds of 
billions of dollars of shares in the Internet sector in Spring 2000 was the equivalent of 
removing short sales restrictions. And the collapse of Internet stock prices coincided 
with a dramatic expansion in the number of Internet companies publicly tradable 
shares. Among many, Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) model explicitly the 
relationship between the number of publicly tradable shares of an asset and the 
propensity for speculative bubbles to form. So far, the theoretical models based on 
agents with heterogeneous beliefs facing short sales restrictions are considered among 
the most convincing models to explain the burst of the Internet bubbles.  
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Another test of this hypothesis on the origin of the 2000 market crash is provided by 
the search for possible discrepancies between option and stock prices. Indeed, even 
though it is difficult for rational investors to borrow Internet stocks for short selling 
due to the locked-up’s discussed above, they should have been able to construct 
equivalent synthetic short positions by purchasing puts and writing calls in the option 
market and either borrowing or lending cash, without the need for borrowing the 
stocks. The question is now transformed into finding some evidence for the use or 
absence of such strategy and why in the later case. One possible thread is that, if short 
selling through option positions was difficult or impractical, prices in the stock and 
options markets should decouple (Lamont and Thaler, 2003). Using a sample of 
closing bid and ask prices for 9026 option pairs for three days in February 2000 along 
with closing trade prices for the underlying equities, Ofek and Richardson (2003) find 
that 36% of the Internet stocks had put-call parity violations as compared to only 
23.8% of the other stocks. One reason for put-call parity violations may be that short-
sale restrictions prevent arbitrage from equilibrating option and stock prices. Hence, 
one interpretation of the finding that there are more put-call parity violations for 
Internet stocks is that short-sale constraints are more frequently binding for Internet 
stocks. Furthermore, Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) provide a 
comprehensive comparison of the prices of stocks and options, using closing options 
quotes and closing trades on the underlying stock for July 1999 through November 
2001. They find that there are large differences between the synthetic stock price and 
the actual stock price, which implies the presence of apparent arbitrage opportunities 
involving selling actual shares and buying synthetic shares. They interpret their 
findings as evidence that short-sale constraints provide meaningful limits to arbitrage 
that can allow prices of identical assets to diverge. 
 
It would thus seem that the issue of the origin of the 2000 crash is settled. However, 
Battalio and Schultz (2006) arrive at the opposite conclusion using proprietary 
intraday option trade and quote data generated in the days surrounding the collapse of 
the Internet bubble. They find that the general public could cheaply short synthetically 
using options, and this information could have been transmitted to the stock market, 
in line with the absence of evidence that synthetic stock prices diverged from actual 
stock prices. The difference between Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Ofek, 
Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) on the one hand and Battalio and Schultz (2006) on 
the other hand is that the former used closing option quotes and last stock trade prices 
from the OptionMetrics Ivy database. As pointed out by Battalio and Schultz (2006), 
OptionMetrics matches closing stock trades that occurred no later than 4:00pm, and 
perhaps much earlier, with closing option quotes posted at 4:02pm. Furthermore, 
option market makers that post closing quotes on day t are not required to trade at 
those quotes on day t+1. Likewise, dealers and specialists in the underlying stocks 
have no obligation to execute incoming orders at the price of the most recent 
transaction. Hence, closing option quotes and closing stock prices obtained from the 
OptionMetrics database do not represent contemporaneous prices at which investors 
could have simultaneously traded. To address this problem, Battalio and Schultz 
(2006) uses a unique set of intraday option price data. They first ensure that the 
synthetic and actual stock prices that they compare are synchronous, and then, they 
discard quotes that, according to exchange rules, are only indicative of the prices at 
which liquidity demanders could have traded. They find that almost all of the 
remaining apparent put-call parity violations disappear when they discard locked or 
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crossed quotes and quotes from fast options markets. In other words, the apparent 
arbitrage opportunities almost always arise from quotes upon which investors could 
not actually trade. Battalio and Schultz (2006) conclude that short-sale constraints 
were not responsible for the high prices of Internet stocks at the peak of the bubble, 
that small investors could have sold short synthetically using options, and this 
information would have been transmitted to the stock market. The fact that investors 
did not take advantage of these opportunities to profit from overpriced Internet stocks 
suggests that the overpricing was not as obvious then as it is now with the benefit of 
hindsight. Schultz (2008) provides additional evidence that contemporaneous lockup 
expirations and equity offerings do not explain the collapse of Internet stocks because 
the stocks that were restricted to a fixed supply of shares by lockup provisions 
actually performed worse than stocks with an increasing supply of shares. This 
shows that current explanations for the collapse of Internet stocks are incomplete. 
 
 
IV. Ridding Bubbles 
 
What is the origin of bubbles? In a nutshell, speculative bubbles are caused by 
“precipitating factors” that change public opinion about markets or that have an 
immediate impact on demand, and by “amplification mechanisms” that take the form 
of price-to-price feedback, as stressed by Shiller (2000). Consider the example of a 
house bubble. A number of fundamental factors can influence price movements in 
housing markets. On the demand side, demographics, income growth, employment 
growth, changes in financing mechanisms or interest rates, as well as changes in 
location characteristics such as accessibility, schools, or crime, to name a few, have 
been shown to have effects. On the supply side, attention has been paid to 
construction costs, the age of the housing stock, and the industrial organization of the 
housing market. The elasticity of supply has been shown to be a critical factor in the 
cyclical behavior of home prices. The cyclical process that we observed in the 1980s 
in those cities experiencing boom-and-bust cycles was caused by the general 
economic expansion, best proxied by employment gains, which drove demand up. In 
the short run, those increases in demand encountered an inelastic supply of housing 
and developable land, inventories of for-sale properties shrank, and vacancy declined. 
As a consequence, prices accelerated. This provided an amplification mechanism as it 
led buyers to anticipate further gains, and the bubble was born. Once prices overshoot 
or supply catches up, inventories begin to rise, time on the market increases, vacancy 
rises, and price increases slow down, eventually encountering downward stickiness. 
The predominant story about home prices is always the prices themselves (Shiller, 
2000; Sornette, 2003); the feedback from initial price increases to further price 
increases is a mechanism that amplifies the effects of the precipitating factors. If 
prices are going up rapidly, there is much word-of-mouth communication, a hallmark 
of a bubble. The word of mouth can spread optimistic stories and thus help cause an 
overreaction to other stories, such as ones about employment. The amplification can 
also work on the downside as well.  
 
Hedge funds are among the most sophisticated investors, probably closer to the ideal 
of “rational arbitrageurs” than any other class of investors. It is therefore particularly 
telling that successful hedge fund managers have been repeatedly reported to ride 
rather than attack bubbles, suggesting the existence of mechanisms that entice rational 
investors to surf bubbles rather than attempt to arbitrage them. However, the evidence 
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may be not that strong, and could even be circular, since only successful hedge-fund 
managers would survive a given 2-5 years period, opening the possibility that the 
mentioned evidence could result in large part from a survival bias (Brown et al., 1992; 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1992). Keeping this in mind, we now discuss two classes of 
models, which attempt to justify why sophisticated “rational” traders would be willing 
to ride bubbles. These models share a common theme: rational investors try to ride 
bubbles, and the incentive to ride the bubble stems from predictable “sentiment”: 
anticipation of continuing bubble growth in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and 
predictable feedback trader demand in De Long et al. (1990b). An important 
implication of these theories is that rational investors should be able to reap gains 
from riding a bubble at the expense of less sophisticated investors. 
 
 
IV-1. Positive Feedback Trading by Noise Traders 
 
The term “noise traders” was introduced first by Kyle (1985) and Black (1986) to 
describe irrational investors. Thereafter, many scholars exploited this concept to 
extend the standard models by introducing the simplest possible heterogeneity in 
terms of two interacting populations of rational and irrational agents. One can say that 
the one-representative-agent theory is being progressively replaced by a two-
representative-agents theory, analogously to the progress from the one-body to the 
two-body problems in Physics. 
 
De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990b) introduced a model of market 
bubbles and crashes which exploits this idea of the possible role of noise traders in the 
development of bubbles, as a possible mechanism for why asset prices may deviate 
from the fundamentals over rather long time periods. Their inspiration came from the 
observation of successful investors such as George Soros, who reveal that they often 
exploit naive investors following positive feedback strategies or momentum 
investment strategies. Positive feedback investors are those who buy securities when 
prices rise and sell when prices fall. In the words of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
positive feedback investors are buying winners and selling losers. In George Soros 
(1987) description of his own investment strategy, he stresses that the key to his 
success was not to counter the irrational wave of enthusiasm which appears in 
financial markets, but rather to ride this wave for a while and sell out much later. The 
model of De Long et al. (1990b) assumes that, when rational speculators receive good 
news and trade on this news, they recognize that the initial price increase will 
stimulate buying by noise traders who will follow positive feedback trading strategies 
with a delay. In anticipation of these purchases, rational speculators buy more today, 
and so drive prices up today higher than fundamental news warrants. Tomorrow, 
noise traders buy in response to today's price increase and so keep prices above 
fundamentals. The key point is that trading between rational arbitrageurs and positive 
feedback traders gives rise to bubble-like price patterns. In their model, rational 
speculators destabilizes prices because their trading triggers positive feedback trading 
by other investors. Positive feedback trading reinforced by arbitrageurs' jumping on 
the bandwagon leads to a positive auto-correlation of returns at short horizons. 
Eventually selling out or going short by rational speculators will pull the prices back 
to fundamentals, entailing a negative autocorrelation of returns at longer horizons. In 
summary, De Long et al. (1990b)’s model suggests the coexistence of intermediate 
horizon momentum and long horizon reversals in stock returns.  
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Their work was followed by a number of behavioral models based on the idea that 
trend chasing by one class of agents produces momentum in stock prices (Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hong and 
Stein, 1999). The most influential empirical evidence on momentum strategies came 
from the work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001), which established that stock 
returns exhibit momentum behavior at intermediate horizons. Strategies which buy 
stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly 
in the past generate significant positive returns over 3- to 12- month holding periods. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) documented long-term reversals in stock returns. Stocks 
that perform poorly in the past perform better over the next 3 to 5 years than stocks 
that perform well in the past. These findings present a serious challenge to the view 
that markets are semi strong-form efficient.  
 
In practice, do investors engage in momentum trading? A growing number of 
empirical studies address momentum trading by investors, with somewhat conflicting 
results. Lakonishok et al. (1992) analyzed the quarterly holdings of a sample of 
pension funds and found little evidence of momentum trading. Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1995) examined the quarterly holdings of 274 mutual funds and found that 
77 percent of the funds in their sample engage in momentum trading (see also 
Wermers (1999)). Nofsinger and Sias (1999) examined total institutional holdings of 
individual stocks and foundd evidence of intra-period momentum trading. Using a 
different sample, Gompers and Metrick (2001) investigated the relation between 
institutional holdings and lagged returns and concluded that once they controlled for 
firm size, there was no evidence of momentum trading. Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu 
(2003) reported that, on a daily and intraday basis, institutional investors engaged in 
trend-chasing in Nasdaq 100 stocks. Finally, Badrinath and Wahal (2004) 
documented the equity trading practices of approximately 1,200 institutions from the 
third quarter of 1987 through the third quarter of 1995. They decomposed trading by 
institutions into (i) the initiation of new positions (entry), (ii) the termination of 
previous positions (exit), and (iii) the adjustments to ongoing holdings. Institutions 
were found to act as momentum traders when they enter stocks but as contrarian 
traders when they exit or make adjustments to ongoing holdings. Badrinath and 
Wahal (2004) found significant differences in trading practices among different types 
of institutions. These studies are limited in their ability to capture the full range of 
trading practices, in part because they focus almost exclusively on the behavior of 
institutional investors. In summary, many experimental studies and surveys suggest 
that positive feedback trading exists in greater or lesser degrees. 
 
IV-2. Synchronization Failures among Rational Traders 
 
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) propose a completely different mechanism justifying 
why rational traders ride rather than arbitrage bubbles. They consider a market where 
arbitrageurs face synchronization risk and, as a consequence, delay usage of arbitrage 
opportunities. Rational arbitrageurs are supposed to know that the market will 
eventually collapse. They know that the bubble will burst as soon as a sufficient 
number of (rational) traders will sell out. However, the dispersion of rational 
arbitrageurs’ opinions on market timing and the consequent uncertainty on the 
synchronization of their sell-off are delaying this collapse, allowing the bubble to 
grow. In this framework, bubbles persist in the short and intermediate term because 
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short sellers face synchronization risk, that is, uncertainty regarding the timing of the 
correction. As a result, arbitrageurs who conclude that othe arbitrageurs are yet 
unlikely to trade against the bubble find it optimal to ride the still-growing bubble for 
a while.  
 
Like other institutional investors, hedge funds with large holdings in U.S. equities 
have to report their quarterly equity positions to the SEC on Form 13F. Brunnermeier 
and Nagel (2004) extracted hedge fund holdings from these data, including those of 
well-known managers such as Soros, Tiger, Tudor, and others in the period from 1998 
to 2000. They found that, over the sample period 1998 to 2000, hedge fund portfolios 
were heavily tilted toward highly priced technology stocks. The proportion of their 
overall stock holdings devoted to this segment was higher than the corresponding 
weight of technology stocks in the market portfolio. In addition, the hedge funds in 
their sample skillfully anticipated price peaks of individual technology stocks. On a 
stock-by-stock basis, hedge-funds started to cut back their holdings before prices 
collapsed, switching to technology stocks that still experienced rising prices. As a 
result, hedge fund managers captured the upturn, but avoided much of the downturn. 
This is reflected in the fact that hedge funds earned substantial excess returns in the 
technology segment of the Nasdaq. 
 
 
V. Complex system theory of bubbles and crashes 
 
Bhattacharya and Yu (2008) provide a summary of recent efforts to expand on the 
above concepts, in particular to address the two main questions of (i) the cause(s) of 
bubbles and crashes and (ii) the possibility to diagnose them ex-ante. Many financial 
economists recognize that positive feedbacks and in particular herding is a key factor 
for the growth of bubbles. Herding can result from a variety of mechanisms, such as 
anticipation by rational investors of noise traders’ strategies (De Long et al., 1990b), 
agency costs and monetary incentives given to competing fund managers (Dass, 
Massa and Patgiri, 2008) sometimes leading to the extreme Ponzi schemes 
(Dimitriadi, 2004), rational imitation in the presence of uncertainty (Roehner and 
Sornette, 2000), and social imitation. Discussing social imitation is often considered 
off-stream among financial economists but warrants some scrutiny, given its 
pervasive presence in human affairs. On the question of the ex-ante detection of 
bubbles, Gurkaynak (2008) summarizes the dismal state of the econometric approach, 
stating that the “econometric detection of asset price bubbles cannot be achieved with 
a satisfactory degree of certainty. For each paper that finds evidence of bubbles, there 
is another one that fits the data equally well without allowing for a bubble. We are 
still unable to distinguish bubbles from time-varying or regime-switching 
fundamentals, while many small sample econometrics problems of bubble tests 
remain unresolved.” The following discusses an arguably off-stream approach which, 
by using concepts and tools from the theory of complex systems and statistical 
physics, suggests that ex-ante diagnostic and partial predictability might be possible 
(see the review in (Sornette, 2003)) 
 
V-1 Social Imitation, collective phenomena, bifurcations and phase transitions 
 
One of the most robust characteristics of humans, which has probably the most visible 
imprint in our social affairs, is imitation and herding. Imitation, in obvious or subtle 
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forms, is a pervasive activity of humans. Imitation has been documented in 
psychology and in neuro-sciences as one of the most elaborated cognitive process, 
requiring a developed cortex and sophisticated processing abilities. In short, we learn 
what we know and how to adapt mostly by imitation all along our life. It seems that 
imitation has evolved as an evolutionary advantageous trait, and may even have 
promoted the development of our anomalously large brain compared with other 
mammals (Dunbar, 1998). It is actually rational to imitate when lacking sufficient 
time, energy and information to take a decision based only on private information and 
processing, that is ... most of the time.  
 
Market behavior is the aggregation of the individual behavior of the many investors 
participating in it. In an economy of traders with completely rational expectations and 
the same information sets, no bubbles are possible (Tirole, 1982). Rational bubbles 
can however occur in infinite horizon models (Blanchard and Watson, 1982), with 
dynamics of growth and collapse driven by noise traders (Johansen, Sornette and 
Ledoit, 1999; Johansen, Ledoit and Sornette, 2000). But the key issue is to understand 
by what detailed mechanism the aggregation of many individual behaviors can give 
rise to bubbles and crashes. Modeling social imitation and social interactions requires 
using approaches, little known to financial economists, that address the fundamental 
question of how global behaviors can emerge at the macroscopic level. This extends 
the representative agent approach, of course, but goes also well beyond the 
introduction of heterogeneous agents. A key insight from statistical physics and 
complex system theory is that systems with a large number of interacting agents, open 
to their environment, self-organize their internal structure and their dynamics with 
novel and sometimes surprising “emergent” out-of-equilibrium properties. A central 
property of a complex system is the possible occurrence and co-existence of many 
large-scale collective behaviors with a very rich structure, resulting from the repeated 
non-linear interactions among its constituents.  
 
How can this help address the question of what is/are the cause(s) of bubbles and 
crashes? The crucial insight is that a system, made of competing investors subjected 
to the myriad of influences, both exogenous news and endogenous interactions and 
reflexivity, can develop into endogenously self-organized self-reinforcing regimes, 
that would qualify as bubbles, and that crashes occur as a global self-organized 
transition. Mathematicians refer to this behavior as a “bifurcation” or more 
specifically as a “catastrophe” (Thom, 1989). Physicists call these phenomena “phase 
transitions” (Stanley, 1987). The implication of modeling a market crash as a 
bifurcation is to solve the question of what makes a crash: in the framework of 
bifurcation theory (or phase transitions), sudden shifts in behavior arise from small 
changes in circumstances, with qualitative changes in the nature of the solutions 
which can occur abruptly when the parameters change smoothly. A minor change of 
circumstances, of interaction strength, or heterogeneity may lead to a sudden and 
dramatic change, such as during an earthquake and a financial crash.  
 
Most approaches to explaining crashes search for possible mechanisms or effects that 
operate at very short time scales (hours, days, or weeks at most). According to the 
“bifurcation” approach, the underlying cause of the crash should be found in the 
preceding months and years, in the progressively increasing build-up of market 
cooperativity, or effective interactions between investors, often translated into 
accelerating ascent of the market price (the bubble). According to this “critical” point 
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of view, the specific manner by which prices collapsed is not the most important 
problem: a crash occurs because the market has entered an unstable phase and any 
small disturbance or process may reveal the existence of the instability. 
 
 
 V-2 The class of Ising models of Social Imitation and phase transitions 
 
Perhaps the simplest and historically most important model describing how the 
aggregation of many individual behaviors can give rise to macroscopic out-of-
equilibrium dynamics such as bubbles, with bifurcations in the organization of social 
systems due to slight changes in the interactions is the Ising model (Callen and 
Shapero, 1974;  Montrol and Badger, 1974).  In particular, Orléan (1989, 1995) has 
captured the paradox of combining rational and imitative behavior under the name 
“mimetic rationality,” by developing models of mimetic contagion of investors in the 
stock markets, which are based on irreversible processes of opinion forming. Roehner 
and Sornette (2000) among others showed that the dynamical updating rules of the 
Ising model are obtained in a natural way as the optimal strategy of rational traders 
with limited information who have the possibility to make up for their lack of 
information via information exchange with other agents within their social network. 
The Ising model is one of the simplest models describing the competition between the 
ordering force of imitation or contagion and the disordering impact of private 
information or idiosyncratic noise (see (McCoy and Wu, 1973) for a technical review).   
 
Starting with a framework suggested by Blume (1993; 1995), Brock (1993), Durlauf 
(1991; 1993;1997; 1999), and Phan et al. (2004) summarize the formalism starting 
with different implementation of the agents’ decision processes whose aggregation is 
inspired from statistical mechanics to account for social influence in individual 
decisions. Lux and Marchesi (1999), Brock and Hommes (1999), Taizoji (2000) and 
Kirman and Teyssiere (2002) have also developed related models in which agents’ 
successful forecasts reinforce the forecasts. Such models have been found to generate 
swings in opinions, regime changes and long memory. An essential feature of these 
models is that agents are wrong for some of the time, but whenever they are in the 
majority they are essentially right. Thus, they are not systematically irrational 
(Kirman, 1997). Sornette and Zhou (2006) show how Bayesian learning added to the 
Ising model framework reproduces the stylized facts of financial markets. Harras and 
Sornette (2008) show how over-learning from lucky runs of random news in the 
presence of social imitation may lead to endogenous bubbles and crashes.  
 
These models allow one to combine the questions on the cause of both bubbles and 
crashes, as resulting from the collective emergence of herding via self-reinforcing 
imitation and social interactions, which are then susceptible to phase transitions or 
bifurcations occurring under minor changes in the control parameters. Hence, the 
difficulty in answering the question of “what causes a bubble and a crash” may in this 
context be attributed to this distinctive attribute of a dynamical out-of-equilibrium 
system to exhibit bifurcation behavior in its dynamics. The line of thought has been 
pursued by one of us and his co-authors, to propose a novel operational diagnostic of 
bubbles. 
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V-3 Bubble as super-exponential price growth, diagnostic and prediction 
 
Bubbles are often defined as exponentially explosive prices, which are followed by a 
sudden collapse. As summarized for instance by Gurkaynak (2008), the problem with 
this definition is that any exponentially growing price regime, that one would call a 
bubble, can be also rationalized by a fundamental valuation model. This is related to 
the problem that the fundamental price is not directly observable, giving no strong 
anchor to understand observed prices. This was exemplified during the last Internet 
bubble by fundamental pricing models, which incorporated real options in the 
fundamental valuation, justifying basically any price. Mauboussin and Hiler (1999) 
were among the most vocal proponents of the proposition offered close to the peak of 
the Internet bubble that culminated in 2000, that better business models, the network 
effect, first-to-scale advantages, and real options effect could account rationally for 
the high prices of dot-com and other New Economy companies. These interesting 
views expounded in early 1999 were in synchrony with the bull market of 1999 and 
preceding years. They participated in the general optimistic view and added to the 
strength of the herd. Later, after the collapse of the bubble, these explanations seemed 
less attractive. This did not escape U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan 
(1997), who said: “Is it possible that there is something fundamentally new about this 
current period that would warrant such complacency? Yes, it is possible. Markets may 
have become more efficient, competition is more global, and information technology 
has doubtless enhanced the stability of business operations. But, regrettably, history is 
strewn with visions of such new eras that, in the end, have proven to be a mirage. In 
short, history counsels caution.'' In this vein, the buzzword “new economy” so much 
used in the late 1990s was also hot in the 1960s during the “tronic boom” also 
followed by a market crash, and during the bubble of the late 1920’s before the Oct. 
1929 crash. In this later case, the “new” economy was referring to firms in the utility 
sector. It is remarkable how traders do not learn the lessons of their predecessors! 
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Fig.1: Trajectory of the Hong-Kong Hang Seng index from 1970 to 2000. The vertical log-scale together 
with the linear time scale allows one to qualify an exponential growth with constant growth rate as a 
straight line. This is indeed the long-term behavior of this market, as shown by the best linear fit 
represented by the solid straight line, corresponding to an average constant growth rate of 13.8% per 
year. The 8 arrows point to 8 local maxima that were followed by a drop of the index of more than 15% 
in less than three weeks (a possible definition of a crash). The 8 small panels at the bottom show the 
upward curvature of the log-price trajectory preceding each of these local maxima, which diagnose an 
unsustainable bubble regime, which culminates at the peak before crashing. 
 
 
A better model derives from the mechanism of positive feedbacks discussed above, 
which gives rise generically to faster-than-exponential growth of price (coined 
hereafter “super-exponential”) (Sornette and Andersen, 2002; Sornette, Takayasu and 
Zhou, 2003). This is nicely illustrated by the price trajectory of the Hong-Kong Hang 
Seng index from 1970 to 2000 shown in figure 1. The Hong Kong financial market is 
repeatedly rated as providing one of the most pro-economic, pro-entrepreneurship and 
free market-friendly environment in the world, and thus provides a textbook example 
of the behavior of weakly regulated liquid and striving financial markets. In figure 1, 
the logarithm of the index price p(t) is plotted as a function of the time (in linear 
scale), so that an upward trending straight line qualifies as exponential growth with a 
constant growth rate: the straight solid line corresponds indeed to an approximately 
constant growth rate of the Hang Seng index equal to 13.8% per year.  However, the 
most striking feature of figure 1 is not this average behavior, but the obvious fact that 
the real market is never following and abiding to a constant growth rate. One can 
observe a succession of price run-ups characterized by growth rates…growing 
themselves: this is reflected visually in figure 1 by transient regimes characterized by 
strong upward curvature of the price trajectory. Such an upward curvature in a linear-
log plot is a first visual diagnostic of a faster than exponential growth (which of 
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course needs to be confirmed by rigorous statistical testing). 
 
Such super-exponential price trajectories are expected from the models of section V-
2. An exponential growing price is characterized by a constant expected growth rate. 
The geometric random walk is the standard stochastic price model embodying this 
class of behaviors. A super-exponential growing price is such that the growth rate 
grows itself as a result of positive feedbacks of price, momentum and other 
characteristics on the growth rate (Sornette and Andersen, 2002). As a consequence of 
the acceleration, the mathematical models generalizing the geometric random walk 
exhibit so-called finite-time singularities. In other words, the resulting processes are 
not defined for all times: the dynamics has to end after a finite life and to transform 
into something else. This captures well the transient nature of bubbles, and the fact 
that the crashes ending the bubbles are often the antechambers to different market 
regimes. Mathematically, the simplest formula to represent a super-exponential 
behavior is a power law with a finite-time singularity at some finite future time tc, 
beyond which another regime emerges: 
 
(1)  ln[E[p(t)]] = A + B (tc-t)m,       where B<0,    0<m<1   . 
  
Here tc is the theoretical critical time corresponding to the end of the transient run-up 
(end of the bubble). Such transient faster-than-exponential growth of the expected 
price E[p(t)] is the definition of a bubble according to Sornette and co-workers. It has 
the major advantage of avoiding the conundrum of distinguishing between 
exponentially growing fundamental price and exponentially growing bubble price, 
which is a problem permeating most of the previous statistical tests developed to 
identify bubbles. The conditions B<0 and 0<m<1 ensure the super-exponential 
acceleration of the price, together with the condition that the price remains finite even 
at tc. Stronger singularities can appear for m<0. 
 
Such a mathematical expression (1) is obtained from models that capture the effect of 
a positive feedback mechanism. Let us illustrate it with the simplest example. Starting 
with a standard proportional growth process dp/dt = r p (omitting for the sake of 
pedagogy the stochastic component), where r is the growth rate, let us assume that r is 
itself an increasing function of the price p, as a result of the positive feedback of the 
price on the future returns. For illustration, let us assume that r is simply proportional 
to p (r=c p, where c is a constant), so that the proportional growth equation become 
dp/dt = c p2. The solution of this equation is of the form (1) where ln[p(t)] is replaced 
by p(t),  with m=-1 and A=0 corresponding to a divergence of p(t) at tc. Many systems 
exhibit similar transient super-exponential growth regimes, which are described 
mathematically by power law growth with an ultimate finite-time singular behavior: 
planet formation in solar systems by runaway accretion of planetesimals, Euler 
equation of inviscid fluids, general relativity coupled to a mass field leading to 
formation of black holes in finite time, Zakharov equation of beam-driven Langmuir 
turbulence in plasma, rupture and material failures, nucleation of earthquakes 
modeled with the slip-and-velocity weakening Ruina-Dieterich friction law, models 
of micro-organisms interacting through chemotaxis aggregating to form fruiting 
bodies, Mullins-Sekerka surface instability, jets from a singular surface, fluid drop 
snap-off, the Euler rotating disk, and so on. Such mathematical equations can actually 
provide an accurate description of the transient dynamics, not too close to the 
mathematical singularity where new mechanisms come into play. The singularity at tc 
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mainly signals a change of regime. In the present context, tc is the end of the bubble 
and the beginning of a new market phase, possible a crash or a different regime. 
 
Such an approach may be thought of at first sight to be inadequate or too naive to 
capture the intrinsic stochastic nature of financial prices, whose null hypothesis is the 
geometric random walk model (Malkiel, 1990). However, it is possible to generalize 
this simple deterministic model to incorporate nonlinear positive feedback on the 
stochastic Black-Scholes model, leading to the concept of stochastic finite-time 
singularities (Sornette and Andersen, 2002; Fogedby and Poukaradzez, 2002; 
Fogedby, 2003; Andersen and Sornette, 2004). Still much work needs to be done on 
this theoretical aspect.  
 
Coming back to figure 1, one can also notice that each burst of super-exponential 
price growth is followed by a crash, here defined for the eight arrowed cases as a 
correction of more than 15% in less than 3 weeks. These examples suggest that the 
non-sustainable super-exponential price growths announced a “tipping point” 
followed by a price disruption, i.e., a crash.  The Hong-Kong Hang Seng index 
provides arguably one of the best textbook example of a free market in which bubbles 
and crashes occur repeatedly: the average exponential growth of the index is 
punctuated by a succession of bubbles and crashes, which seem to be the norm rather 
than the exception. 
 
More sophisticated models than (1) have been proposed to take into account the 
interplay between technical trading and herding (positive feedback) versus 
fundamental valuation investments (negative mean-reverting feedback). Accounting 
for the presence of inertia between information gathering and analysis on the one 
hand and investment implementation on the other hand (Ide and Sornette, 2002) or 
between trend followers and value investing (Farmer, 2002), the resulting price 
dynamics develop second-order oscillatory terms and boom-bust cycles. Value 
investing does not necessarily cause prices to track value. Trend following may cause 
short-term trend in prices, but also cause longer-term oscillations. The simplest model 
generalizing (1) and including these ingredients is the so-called log-periodic power 
law (LPPL) model (see Sornette (2003) and references therein). Formally, some of the 
corresponding formulas can be obtained by considering that the exponent m is a 
complex number with an imaginary part, where the imaginary part expresses the 
existence of a preferred scaling ratio g describing how the continuous scale invariance 
of the power law (1) is partially broken into a discrete scale invariance (Sornette, 
1998). The LPPL structure may also reflect the discrete hierarchical organization of 
networks of traders, from the individual to trading floors, to branches, to banks, to 
currency blocks. More generally, it may reveal the ubiquitous hierarchical 
organization of social networks recently reported (Zhou et al., 2005) to be associated 
with the social brain hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998). 
 
Examples of calibrations of financial bubbles with one implementation of the LPPL 
model are the 8 super-exponential regimes discussed above in figure 1: the 8 small 
insets at the bottom of figure 1 show the LPPL calibration on the Hang Seng index. 
Preliminary tests reported (Sornette, 2003) suggest that the LPPL model provides a 
good starting point to detect bubbles and forecast their most probable end. Rational 
expectation models of bubbles a la Blanchard and Watson implementing the LPPL 
model (Johansen et al., 1999, 2000) have shown that the end of the bubble is not 
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necessarily accompanied by a crash, but it is indeed the time where a crash is the most 
probable. But crashes can occur before (with smaller probability) or not at all. That is, 
a bubble can land smoothly, approximately one-third of the time, according to 
preliminary investigations (Johansen and Sornette, 2004). Therefore, only 
probabilistic forecasts can be developed. Probability forecasts are indeed valuable and 
commonly used in daily life, such as in weather forecast. 
 
In a series of empirical papers, the second author and his collaborators have used this 
concept to test empirically for bubbles. Johansen and Sornette (2004) provide perhaps 
the most inclusive series of tests of this approach. First, they identify the most 
extreme cumulative losses (drawdowns) in a variety of asset classes, markets and 
epochs, and show that they belong to a probability density distribution, which is 
distinct from the distribution of 99% of the smaller drawdowns (the more “normal” 
market regime). These drawdowns can thus be called “outliers” or “kings”. Second, 
they show that, for two-third of these extreme drawdowns, the market prices followed 
a super-exponential behavior prior to their occurrences, as characterized by a 
calibration of the power law with a finite-time singularity.  
 
This approach provides a systematic approach to diagnose for bubbles ex-ante, as 
shown in a series of real-life tests (Sornette and Zhou, 2006; Sornette, Woodard and 
Zhou, 2008; Zhou and Sornette, 2003; 2006, 2007; 2008). While this approach has 
enjoyed a large visibility in the professional financial community around the world 
(banks, mutual funds, hedge-funds, investment houses, and so on), it has not yet 
received the attention from the academic financial community that it perhaps deserves 
given the stakes. This is probably due to several factors, which include: (i) the origin 
of the hypothesis coming from analogies with complex critical systems in Physics and 
the theory of complex systems, which constitutes a well-known obstacle to climb the 
ivory towers of standard financial economics; (ii) the non-standard (from an 
econometric view point) formulation of the statistical tests performed until present (in 
this respect, see the attempts in terms of a Bayesian analysis of LPPL precursors 
(Chang and Feigenbaum, 2006) to focus on the time series of returns instead of prices, 
and of regime-switching model of LPPL (Chang and Feigenbaum, 2007)), (iii) the 
non-standard expression of some of the mathematical models underpinning the 
hypothesis; and (iv) perhaps an implicit general belief in academia that forecasting 
financial instabilities is inherently impossible. 
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